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I. Introduction 
 
Globalization brought with it a marked increase in 
opportunities for Chinese people to encounter American culture 
compared with the period before China’s reform and opening. This 
led to an ongoing process of blending between traditional 
Chinese and Western culture, centered on American culture, and 
the Chinese public, and particularly young people, have 
willingly absorbed imported American culture. The American diet, 
including Coca-Cola, Kentucky Fried Chicken and MacDonald's 
hamburgers, steadily increased its market as it caught on with 
youth, an indication of the strength of the U.S. food industry 
in the Chinese market.1 In the sales rankings for 2002 released 
by the Restaurant Association of China, only one Chinese 
restaurant made the top 10 list, with the remaining nine held 
by five Kentucky Fried Chicken outlets, three MacDonald’s 
outlets, and one pizza restaurant. In the area of culture, 
roughly half of the foreign films and animated cartoon films 
for television programs authorized by the Chinese government 
for airing in China were made by American companies. Tianlai 
MTV, which broadcasts the latest Western pop music for one hour 
every day, is quite popular. Thus, American culture has won 
overwhelming support in China in a broad range of areas, 
including business, academic research, movies and music.  
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On the other hand however, Chinese anti-American 
nationalism, which grew strong in the latter half of the 1990s, 
drew attention at home and abroad. The resurgence of nationalism 
in China, symbolized by The China That Can Say No, (which was 
translated in the United States by conservative forces), the 
mistaken U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and 
anti-American demonstrations following a collision between U.S. 
and Chinese military planes, are said to have aroused enormous 
concern among Conservatives in the United States, which is 
envisaged as China’s latent and long-term rival.  
Chinese nationalism, cited as one of “Five Voices”2 that 
became conspicuous in the wake of the end of the Cold War, has 
been the subject of various studies.3 Ying-shih Yu advocates 
the “development stage theory” and argues that the Chinese 
government’s policy of seeking both “wealth” and “strength” 
amid the country’s reform and opening is closely tied to the 
rise of Chinese nationalism in the wake of the end of the Cold 
War. Yongnian Zheng contends that the Chinese public’s attitude 
toward foreign countries is being influenced by other 
countries’ attitudes toward China. Suisheng Zhao, who sees 
nationalism as one “instilled by the leadership,” underscores 
the importance of the patriotic campaign in China in the 1990s 
and characterizes the nationalism of the latter half of the 
1990s as state-led patriotic nationalism.4 
What images of the United States are held by the Chinese 
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public, who take an open-minded approach to American culture 
but occasionally display a strong show of nationalism? How 
should Chinese people’s nationalism, which has shown strong 
growth since the latter half of the 1990s, be interpreted? In 
this paper I will attempt to shed light on these issues. 
It is not easy for images of foreign countries or public 
opinion about other countries to directly influence the 
formulation of foreign policy, but they can still exert a 
constraining force on its formulation. Chinese public opinion 
of foreign countries, which is built on the basis of the images 
of other countries formed in China during its process of 
breaking away from the totalitarian system, still has many 
problems to be addressed and should be characterized as still 
in a growth phase. Yet, the public’s voices, however crude they 
may be, have grown so strong that the Chinese government cannot 
neglect them in making decisions on external action.5 From the 
1990s onward, in particular, the Chinese public’s images of the 
United States and their views about the United States have 
become an important factor in Sino-American relations. 
Most of the research into China’s external policy after 
the end of the Cold War has attempted to analyze it via three 
categories: the elite leadership that makes the ultimate policy 
decisions; the public intellectuals who are likely to wield a 
certain measure of influence over the formation of public 
opinion as well as policy decisions by the government; and 
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sub-elites and the general public.6 Following this 
categorization, this paper primarily focuses on the general 
public’s images of the United States. The process of mass media 
influencing opinion leaders and the opinion leaders in turn 
influencing the general public is what Lazarsfeld calls “the 
two-step flow of communications.” This paper attempts to 
elucidate the images of the United States among the general 
public in China by examining how statements of opinion leaders 
are conveyed by the mass media and the Internet and how they 
strike a chord with the Chinese public. 
In Chapter II, changes in the Chinese public’s images of 
the United States up to the present are briefly examined, and 
present images of the United States are brought to the fore based 
on the results of recent opinion surveys. 
   Books and television dramas dealing with the United States 
or U.S.-China relations that became huge hits since the 1990s 
can be generally categorized into two types. One includes those 
that analyze U.S. perceptions of China, U.S. policy toward China, 
and the future potential of U.S.-China relations, focusing on 
the relations between the two countries. Books focusing on 
Sino-American relations that played well to the Chinese public 
include those written for a general readership, as well as 
scholarly publications that reflect academic nationalism7 in 
China. The second category is “overseas student novels,” 
another new trend since the 1990s that is said to have created 
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a current in Chinese literature.  
Given the primary interest of this article, in Section 
1 of Chapter III, the focus is on books for a general readership, 
since I hope to shed light on the Chinese public’s images of 
the United States, which may lie behind the huge success of these 
literary works. In Section 2, I examine “overseas student 
novels,” and clarify changes in Chinese people’s images of the 
United States. 
The anti-American nationalism found in Internet forums 
(BBSs) is generally described as quite noticeable. Chapter IV 
considers the characteristics of anti-American nationalism 
seen in BBSs. 
 
II. The Chinese Public’s Images of the U.S. Seen through Opinion 
Polls 
 
1. Changes in the Chinese Public’s Images of the United States 
 
The outbreak of the Pacific War gave Chinese people a strong 
“comrades-in-arms” image of the United States, and their 
interest in the United States and Americans at large rose 
rapidly. Even immediately before the establishment of the 
People’s Republic of China, there were high expectations of the 
United States, and the view that China should follow a “Third 
Path” instead of “leaning to one side” remained strongly rooted 
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among some intellectuals.  
However, with the establishment of the People’s Republic 
of China, and in particular with the direct engagement between 
the United States and China in the Korean War, the United States 
became “the American imperialists” and the U.S. government 
became “the first target to be defeated.” With this, China 
entered into a period of confrontation with the United States. 
In the 1970s, when U.S. President Richard Nixon visited 
China and the Sino-American rapprochement was achieved, the 
United States, which had long been regarded with hostility by 
the Chinese people, in a complete reversal, became a “friend.” 
In the wake of the reform and open-door policy, for the 
first time since the establishment of the new China the Chinese 
public was freed from the constraints of ideology. People were 
able to make contact with Americans “in person” and gained the 
ability to understand the United States and Americans with their 
own eyes and heads. They turned their eyes to the outside world 
only after the launch of the reform and opening policy, and what 
they felt at that time were neither favorable impressions nor 
hostility, but a plethora of curiosity. 
He Shang, an essay that became a craze in China in the 
1980s, came onto the scene against this background. When the 
Chinese looked at their own country in the global context, amid 
the wave of reform and opening, they were shocked and ashamed 
by the fact that China, which had led the world culturally and 
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economically from ancient times, had now almost entirely lost 
its cultural and political superiority. At the same time, He 
Shang helped create a mood that “inspired China once again.” 
Thus, with the reform and opening policy in the 1980s, 
Chinese people became acutely aware of the gaps that had emerged 
between their home country and the world’s advanced nations, 
and began to search for reasons why China had lost the ability 
to lead the world and fallen behind other countries economically. 
Under these circumstances, the United States came to symbolize 
“an advanced country with strong national power” and “a country 
that can enjoy an affluent way of life,” thus becoming a target 
and subject of adoration for developing China. 
Furthermore, there were indications that the Chinese 
public’s longing for political democracy involved a measure of 
trust in the information carried by American news media, and 
further in the United States itself. According to a private 
survey by one expert on China, only 13% of university students 
listened to the Voice of America (VOA) before the student 
movement in 1986, but this figure shot up to 30% during the 
student movement. Moreover, while 70% of Chinese university 
students said they trusted the objectivity of VOA news reporting, 
75% were found to distrust reports by China’s 
government-controlled news media.8 
Hidenori Ijiri points out that in the 1970s, when American 
intellectuals looked at China, they saw a “mirror image” of 
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their own society.9 And indeed, for Chinese, images of the United 
States in the 1980s were in fact a “mirror image” of their own 
society. It cannot be entirely denied that this sort of image 
of the outside world stems from the problem of “the 
intellectual’s attitude to find the ‘evil’ in one’s own society 
through the ‘virtue’ in the other’s society, which leads to a 
one-sided argument that can very easily sweep away the extremely 
common-sense question that something similar to the ‘evil’ in 
one’s own society may actually exist in the other society as 
well, and thus is not a genuinely subjective and internal 
criticism of a foreign society.”10 In other words, many Chinese 
tried to “give China renewed inspiration” by reflecting an 
“ailing China” in the mirror of the United States. 
Furthermore, in China, which had just begun to push 
forward its reform and opening policy, it was impossible for 
intellectuals in the 1980s to become suddenly and completely 
free from their ideological tethers. As pointed out by David 
Shambaugh, China’s perception of the United States at the time 
was quite shallow and scholars in China did not really 
understand the United States.11 
Since the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, the images of the 
United States held by China and the Chinese public have shifted 
in tandem with changes in the international situation in the 
aftermath of the end of the Cold War. 
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2. Images of the U.S. Based on Actual Conditions 
 
With the increasing opening of China from the 1990s, not only 
intellectuals but the general public as well began to form their 
own images of the United States. Since the latter half of the 
1990s, many research organizations have conducted surveys about 
Chinese opinions regarding other countries.  
According to an opinion survey conducted in May 1996 by 
the China Youth Daily, while 57.2% of Chinese polled cited the 
United States as the “most disliked country” in 1995, against 
31.3% in 1994, 90% of the respondents recognized the United 
States as an affluent and strong nation. While 80% believed the 
United States was really trying to promote democratization, 90% 
thought that the United States had adopted hegemonism in its 
policy toward China. 
According to a report by Dentsu Communication Institute 
Inc. in FY2000, the proportion of Chinese choosing the United 
States as the country with which China should build close 
relations first and foremost was 75% in 1996, 69.1% in 1998 and 
80% in 2000. 
According to a 2002 survey conducted by the Pew Research 
Center of the United States, 55% of Chinese polled said they 
liked American culture, while 36% voiced a dislike for it.12 
Surveys conducted by research organizations in China, 
Japan and the United States present similar results. For Chinese 
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people, the United States is both the country they like most 
and the one they dislike most. The images of the United States 
held by Chinese people are complex and ambivalent, and involve 
two contradictory vectors. 
At present, to the best knowledge of this author, there 
have been no follow-up surveys that consistently use the same 
base of Chinese pollees. However, the Asahi Inquiry and Research 
institute periodically surveys Chinese people in the same district, 
and as part of the survey, asks their opinion of the United States. 
The institute interviewed males and females aged 20 or over in 
Beijing in 1999, asking for their opinions about “the eight 
countries of Japan, the United States and Asian nations,” and 
from 2001, the institute has conducted annual surveys about “the 
four countries of Japan, South Korea, China and the United 
States.” The images of the United States and the images of their 
own country held by Chinese pollees are summarized below, based 
on the results of these surveys (see Table 1 and Table 2).13 
 
Table 1. 
 Image of the U.S Factors 
threatening 
peace in Asia
Country 
holding the 
key to Asian 
security 
Image of 
China 
1999 Military power (49%)
Economic power (25%)
Unilateral 
dominance by 
the U.S. 
(50%)    
China-Taiwan 
situation 
(41%) 
U.S. (35%)    
China (44%) 
Country with 
a unique 
culture and 
tradition 
(42%)    
Economic 
power (1%) 
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Table 2.  
 Do you like the U.S.? Country 
constituting 
a military 
threat 
Country 
China should 
get along 
with 
Country with 
the biggest 
influence in 
Asia in ten 
years 
2001 Like (33%), Dislike 
(31%)    
Neither (33%) 
U.S. (63%) 
 
U.S. (31%) U.S. (10%)   
China (73%) 
2002 Like (24%)    
Dislike (45%)    
Neither (30%) 
U.S. (69%) U.S. (58%) 
(Country 
with which 
economic 
relations 
should be 
deepened) 
U.S. (5%)    
China (81%) 
 
Jianwei Wang, on the basis of several hundred interviews 
with Chinese intellectuals, businessmen and diplomats, 
concluded that Chinese intellectuals tended to regard the U.S. 
government favorably but that many of them hold negative images 
of American society.14  
The opinion surveys cited above highlight three 
distinctive results. First, between 1999 and 2002, around 30% 
of Chinese people consistently held a positive feeling toward 
the United States, and around 40% expressed dislike toward it. 
In China, the proportions of those who felt friendliness toward 
the United States and those who felt animosity were relatively 
stable, though with slight changes. 
Second, over 50% of Chinese saw the United States as a 
military threat to their national security. On the other hand, 
an increasing number felt that China should deepen its exchanges 
with the United States. These results indicate that Chinese 
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nationalism toward the United States is by no means an 
exclusionist nationalism but rather stems from concerns over 
the security policy of the United States, which has the power 
to influence China’s security situation. 
Third, the results of the opinion polls indicate an 
increasingly strong confidence among Chinese people in their 
own country against the backdrop of the high economic growth. 
A number of dissonances consistently existed between the 
United States and China from 1999 through 2002, and the tensions 
rose suddenly when an American reconnaissance plane and a 
Chinese fighter jet collided off Hainan Island in April 2001. 
However, judging from the “U.S.-China attitude survey” (Table 
3) conducted by the Asahi Inquiry and Research institute of males and 
females aged 20 or over in the three Chinese cities of Beijing, 
Shanghai and Chongqing in April 2001, right after the collision, 
this unforeseen incident between the United States and China 
had very little impact on Chinese views of the United States, 
showing that the images of the United States by Chinese people 
as described above maintained a measure of stability throughout 
the 1990s. 
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Table 3  
 Do you like 
the U.S.? 
Image of the 
U.S. 
Would you 
like to 
visit the 
U.S.? 
Country you 
would like to 
send your 
children to 
study 
Extent of 
U.S. threat 
you feel 
Is the U.S. 
a rival or 
partner? 
 
April 
2001 
Like (31%)  
Dislike 
(31%)    
Neither 
(28%) 
Economic 
development 
(36%)    
Hegemonism 
(31%) 
Yes (64%)  
No (7%) 
U.S. (33%)    
Studying in 
China will do 
(24%) 
Strongly 
(7%)    
Some threat 
(50%)    
No threat 
(38%) 
Rival 
(44%)    
Partner 
(25%)    
Not sure 
(26%) 
 
After the end of the Cold War, with the disclosure of 
records and documents from former Soviet bloc communist 
countries, research on Sino-Soviet relations, particularly 
concerning the Korean War, has drawn renewed attention, 
becoming a hot research subject in Chinese diplomatic history. 
The publication of the results of these research activities 
helped rekindle Chinese people’s memories of the direct 
U.S.-China military conflict that occurred in the 1950s. 
According to a 2001 questionnaire survey about the 
“Korean War” (in Chinese, the “Kangmei Yuanchao movement,” 
meaning “resist the U.S. and help Korea”), 91% of Chinese 
university students replied that “China should not forget the 
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Korean War,” but 72.7% of elementary school students said they 
did not know the meaning of the “Kangmei Yuanchao movement.”15 
This indicates that memories of the direct engagement between 
China and the United States have become fairly diluted among 
Chinese children. 
As seen above, the images of the United States held by 
Chinese people are complex and ambivalent, involving two 
contradictory vectors of friendliness and animosity. On 
national security issues, Chinese people cannot wipe away their 
concerns about the United States. Despite this, many have shaken 
off the self-doubt experienced during the 1980s and opted for 
the building of friendly relations. This attitude, which did 
not change significantly as a result of unexpected incidents, 
can be described as an external perception of the Chinese public 
based on the current state of U.S.-China bilateral relations. 
 
 
III. Images of the U.S. Held by the Chinese Public Seen through 
Hit Items 
 
In the 1990s, Chinese media and publishers, engaged in a fierce 
race for survival, came under intense pressure to create trends 
to meet the needs of consumers. Best-selling books that came 
out onto the market under commercialism serve as a prism of the 
images of the United States held by the Chinese public who are 
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also consumers. 
 
1. Images of the U.S. Held by the Chinese Public Shown by 
Best-Selling Books 
 
The China That Can Say No, a book that offers a direct analysis 
of U.S.-China relations, became a bestseller when it was 
published in the summer of 1996. It came as a great shock to 
Americans who believed that young internationalist Chinese 
intellectuals regarded the United States favorably and felt 
friendship toward it.16 The book argues that the American 
economy and culture will inevitably fall into decline within 
15 years, and offers an analytical view that the containment 
of China is a long-term strategy of the United States and that 
Japan and Southeast Asian countries will join the “anti-China 
club” sponsored by the United States. To counter this U.S. 
policy, the book argues that China should take a resolute stance, 
adopting an “anti-containment policy,” discontinue trade that 
is not beneficial to China, and not hesitate to make 
preparations for war even at the expense of temporary economic 
sacrifices. 
The book, which purports to expose U.S. hostility toward 
China, emphasizes the harmful effects of Sino-American trade 
on China, and calls for war preparedness, won broad sympathy 
among the Chinese public. When it was published in June 1996, 
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U.S.-China relations were already quite strained over such 
issues as the U.S. government’s issuance of a visa to Taiwanese 
President Lee Teng-hui in 1995 and the Strait of Taiwan crisis 
caused by Taiwan’s presidential election in March 1996. 
According to a questionnaire survey of 20 universities 
conducted by the Institute of Taiwan Studies of the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences in 1996, most university and graduate 
students said they would be willing to serve military duty if 
Taiwan opted for a path of independence. This indicates that 
when The China That Can Say No was published, the ground was 
sufficiently prepared to absorb its nationalistic arguments, 
particularly among young people. 
Following the publication of The China That Can Say No, 
books primarily intended to criticize the United States were 
published one after another, including Why China Says No 
(Zhongguoren Weishenme shuo bu), China Says No (Zhongguo Jiushi 
Yao shuo bu), and China Says More Than No (Zhongguo Bu Jinjin 
shuo bu). 
Among them, Behind the Making of China into A Monster (Zai 
Yaomohua de Beihou), edited by Prof. Li Xiguang? of Qinghua 
University in 1997 upon his return from the United States, 
argues that the U.S. mass media is not objective about China 
and only offers prejudiced reports about it. The book, which 
displays disappointment with the United States from authors who 
once had high expectations of it, contends that the U.S. media 
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presents China as the biggest enemy of the United States, does 
not stop at making it look ugly and in fact turns China into 
a monster. As a result, an image of China as a monster has been 
implanted in the American general public. The authors criticize 
the attitudes of the American mass media and the images of China 
created by that media. The book sold immensely well. 
The argument in Behind the Making of China into A Monster 
that “the United States sees China as an enemy” is consistent 
with that of The China That Can Say No. Of the eight authors 
of Behind the Making of China into A Monster, five had earned 
or were about to earn degrees in the United States at the time 
of the book’s publication, while three had worked in the United 
States as guest researchers. The book, written by authors with 
such backgrounds, gave the impression to the general public in 
China that the book’s analysis of the United States carried 
sufficient authority.  
In 1999, Qiao Liang, an Air Force colonel and deputy chief 
of the Creation Office of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) 
General Political Department, and Wang Xiangsui, an Air Force 
colonel in the Political Department of the Guangzhou Army 
District, co-authored War Beyond the Limit (Chao Xian Zhan), 
which presented new modes of war in the era of globalization, 
or potential threats of war by terrorists, non-government 
organization (NGO) activists and hackers, and appealed for the 
need for measures to counter such threats. Given the enormous 
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damage done to the United States by the terrorist attacks in 
September 2001, this book can be objectively valued as showing 
a certain measure of foresight. Unexpectedly, it earned 
popularity for reasons other than the authors’ original 
intentions. The public praised the book for offering the 
prospect that China, a weak country, could defeat the United 
States, a major power, though means such as terrorism and 
hacking.  
These best-selling books of the 1990s brought renewed 
attention to anti-American nationalism in China. The authors 
were all elites with higher education, and the radical 
criticisms of the United States they voice have common features 
with discussions by contemporary scholars of international 
relations in that both represent “resistance and criticisms 
against the West-dominated globalism.”17 The three above-cited 
books—The China That Can Say No, Behind the Making of China into 
A Monster and War Beyond the Limit—became bestsellers because 
they express the anti-American nationalist sentiment of the 
Chinese public, who want China to take a tough foreign policy 
stance toward the United States and wish for a victory over the 
it. With the exception of Behind the Making of China into A 
Monster, these books simply advocate a nationalistic strategy 
toward the United States, and do not clarify specific reasons 
why China should adopt a tough strategy toward it. 
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2. Chinese Public Images of the U.S. Shown in Novels by Students 
 
In addition to books addressing politics and foreign policy, 
the Chinese public in the 1990s were also drawn to “overseas 
student novels,” which are said to have established a category 
of their own in post-Cultural Revolution Chinese literature. 
The boom of students’ novels has gone through four stages since 
the 1990s. 
In the 1980s, an “overseas studies boom” caught on in China. 
Those who had opportunities to study overseas were regarded as 
lucky people of the day and became targets of adulation. Those 
given the chance to study in the United States left China, 
cherishing their “American dreams,” while those who failed to 
obtain the chance believed without the slightest doubt in the 
success of the overseas students. However, the “myth of studying 
abroad” was shattered by “overseas student novels,” which grew 
in popularity in the 1990s, as well as by television dramas based 
on these novels. 
Pekingese in New York, published in 1991, was made into 
a television drama after becoming an enormous hit in bookstores, 
with wide ramifications within China. The book tells the story 
of a Chinese couple who left an easy life in China to go to the 
United States with great dreams, but had to struggle to live 
there and eventually broke up, going their separate ways in 
pursuit of happiness. The book unveiled the life of Chinese 
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students studying abroad, who had previously been associated 
with “get-rich-quick” dreams or “opportunities for 
self-enrichment,” and presented the Chinese public with the 
reality of Chinese students abroad who had to fight lonely 
battles without support and found themselves unable to adjust 
to different cultures. 
The book became the first of a string of works on Chinese 
living overseas. Manhattan’s China Lady was published in 1992, 
followed by Shanghaier in Tokyo in 1996, which was made into 
a serialized television drama. Our Life as Students Studying 
Abroad of 1999 also created a sensation. For Chinese people at 
large, studying in the United States or in Japan as foreign 
students became almost synonymous with having to earn a meager 
living on part-time jobs. 
Following the reversal of the public image of fortunate 
students going abroad during the first stage of the students’ 
novels, a second stage emerged, involving novels, films and 
television dramas depicting the hardship of Chinese living 
overseas, painfully torn between the differing cultures of the 
United States and China. The Gua Sha Treatment portrays a 
Chinese couple with a young son, who lead a stable life in the 
United States until they invite the husband’s father from China 
to live with them. One day, when the little boy catches a cold, 
his grandfather tries to heal him using a traditional Chinese 
“Gua Sha” treatment. This home treatment, which is quite common 
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in China, involves rubbing a patient’s bosom or back with a 
copper coin wet with water or oil, and it gives a congestive 
purple color to the skin. The Americans cannot comprehend this 
particular treatment of Oriental medicine, and in a subsequent 
trial, the boy’s parents and the grandfather are found guilty 
of child abuse, resulting in the breakup of the once-happy 
Chinese family.  
Two novels written by Shi Xiaoke, The Americans of 2001 
and The Gene War of 2002, also deal with Americans’ 
misunderstanding and distrust of Chinese people living in the 
United States. The recently published Distress in America – The 
Battle between Chinese of U.S. Nationality and American Laws” 
covers a variety of legal cases involving Chinese residing in 
the United States. In explaining the purpose of the book’s 
publication, one editor writes, “the United States may be a 
glittering place in the eyes of ordinary Chinese, but readers 
are encouraged to try to understand the true picture of 
America.” 
The so-called students’ novels entered into the third 
stage toward the final years of the 1990s. Beginning with the 
novels in the first stage, the general tendency was to tell about 
Chinese students abroad busily making ends meet with part-time 
dishwashing jobs. However, third-stage student novels focus on 
the “winners,” or Chinese who are able to earn a certain level 
of social status and stable life in middle-class society in the 
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United States. In Sunshine on the West Coast,” a Chinese 
scientist couple, inspired by the American dream, go through 
great hardship before finding a place in the United States where 
they think at first they can live in peace. Later, however, they 
are awakened to their roots, and decide to go back to China, 
discarding their green cards and selling off their house and 
cars.  
From the latter half of the 1990s, the Chinese government 
began to offer various preferential measures in a bid to lure 
back Chinese researchers who had earned their degrees abroad 
as well as others who had a certain degree of business and 
commercial experience in foreign countries. Thanks to this 
policy, many Chinese students studying overseas returned home. 
The third wave of the students’ novels, represented by Sunshine 
on the West Coast,” reflected this “coming home (Hai Gui)” 
phenomenon.  
On the heels of the books on the “Hai Gui people” came 
a fourth boom of students’ novels, which this time turned their 
attention to much younger students going abroad. In recent years, 
there has been a distinct trend of young students between the 
age of 15 and 17 going to various parts of the world, including 
the United States, Singapore and New Zealand, to study. Unlike 
the first-generation students who had to earn their living 
through part-time jobs, the so-called second-generation 
students receive sufficient financial help from their parents 
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at home. The initial public image of these young students was 
that they were full of confidence in themselves as well as in 
their native country. Popular novels on these young students 
include The Birds of the Sun, A Girl in New York, Liu Yiting, 
a Girl at Harvard, Going to America at the Age of 16, and 
Feathered Sheep. 
As indicated by the title The Birds of the Sun, these young 
Chinese students grew up in the sunlight, without wanting for 
anything, without experiencing any setback in their lives, and 
with boundless prospects. But this image began to go through 
a major change. In 2003, a new debate on the “young students” 
began in the mass media and on the Internet. It was reported 
that some of these young students were driving around in 
Mercedes-Benzes, and spending money lavishly. Some had become 
addicted to gambling. It was claimed that as these young 
students had grown up without experiencing any want, they were 
incapable of supporting themselves, and as they were vulnerable 
to failures, they were prone to criminal behavior. Indeed, there 
were instances of students actually being involved in criminal 
acts.18 
Objective reporting on these young students also began 
to appear, though only gradually, looking at the tragic 
realities of some of them, in a complete turnaround from the 
glorious image of “birds enjoying a shower of sunlight,” and 
including what host countries had to say about their behavior. 
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   The new literary phenomenon that began in the 1990s helped 
turn the Chinese people’s adoration of the United States into 
disenchantment, bringing home to them a true picture of the 
United States and the anything-but-easy life of Chinese there 
struggling for livelihood and distressed by cultural 
differences. In recent years, it has become fashionable to write 
about the success stories of foreign nationals living in China, 
including foreign part-timers coming to China in pursuit of the 
“Chinese dream.” This is creating increased confidence in China 
among people at large, after they suffered disenchanted with 
the United States. 
The anti-American sentiments among the Chinese seen in 
these developments are simply a process of reaffirmation of 
their own self-awareness, rather than anti-American 
nationalism. The so-called anti-American nationalism is a 
manifestation of Chinese people’s reinforced sense of belonging 
amid the spread of globalization, and may be relativized within 
the process of the formation of China’s self-awareness. 
 
IV. Anti-American Nationalism Seen in Bulletin Board Systems 
(BBSs) 
 
1. Characteristics of Internet Users in China 
 
As shown in Table 4, the number of Internet users in China has 
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been growing year by year. According to the New China News Agency, 
the number of users topped 78 million in December 2003, making 
China the second largest Internet population in the world. A 
closer look at the composition of users (based on the figures 
announced by the China Internet Network Information Center 
(CNNIC) in June 2003) reveals that young people aged 35 or below 
accounted for 80% of the total number of users. Vocational 
school students and junior high and high school students 
together accounted for 83.5%. In other words, 80% of Internet 
users in China are youth with middle-level academic 
backgrounds. 
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As shown in the above data, the radical nationalism 
expressed via the Internet consists mostly of the opinions of 
young Chinese. However, the reality in China is that public 
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opinions about foreign countries are being formed in two 
separated spaces: the mass media and the Internet. For this 
reason, though public opinions expressed via the Internet only 
represent a minority view, opinions based on images of foreign 
countries formed on the Internet still shape the general 
public’s opinions and thus are capable of influencing the 
Chinese government’s foreign policy. 
 
2. BBS Management Method 
 
The “BBS Forum for Adamantly Protesting the Outrage Committed 
by NATO,” established after the U.S. accidental bombing of the 
Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999, is said to be the 
touchstone of the Chinese government’s guidance of Internet 
opinions. 
Within a month after the board’s establishment, the 
number of posts reached 90,000, and on June 19, the board was 
renamed the “Forum for a Stronger Nation.” In early August, 
moderators exclusively in charge of the Forum were selected, 
and an eight-person panel of administrators was formed in 
September. The board is freely accessible between 8 a.m. and 
midnight every day. It has grown to include a total of 15 forums, 
including a China-Japan forum. The number of people accessing 
the board tends to increase dramatically when sensitive 
problems for China emerge. On March 18, 2000, the day of the 
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presidential election in Taiwan, as many as 230,000 users 
visited the board, with a total of 56.8 million accesses. On 
the following day, the number of visitors rose to 270,000, with 
over 69 million accesses. When newly elected Taiwanese 
President Chen Shui-bian delivered his inaugural address, a 
total of 78.88 million accesses were made to the board, by more 
than 300,000 visitors.19 
Through the management of the “Forum for a Stronger 
Nation,” the Chinese government has learned methods for guiding 
public opinion on BBSs. The principal task of those responsible 
for board management is the deletion of extreme opinions. 
Universities manage their BBSs by having students sympathetic 
to the government write in favorable opinions, and also use such 
students to argue against people making anonymous 
anti-government statements in chat rooms.20 For fear of 
alienating users through excessive restrictions and the 
deletion of posts, the basic BBS management policy is “not to 
delete those posts that do not have to be deleted.” Thus, 
restrictions on BBSs and chat rooms are relatively loose. 
The Chinese government takes the potential influence of 
the Internet on administration very seriously. Fully aware of 
the asymmetry between English and Chinese language in 
transmitting information via the Internet, the government is 
redoubling efforts to boost the external transmission of 
China’s policies.21 Furthermore, using chat rooms of the 
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People's Daily Online and other places, experts from the 
Institute of International Studies under the direct control of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Institute of 
Contemporary International Relations under the aegis of the 
State Council, retired ambassadors and other people subject to 
relatively strong control by the government, regularly exchange 
views with Internet users on international issues. These 
activities also serve to convey the government’s official 
policy lines to Internet users. 
 
3. BBSs and Anti-American Nationalism 
 
Topics taken up at the “Forum for a Strong Nation” basically 
concern four areas: U.S.-China relations, Taiwan, 
democratization and corruption.22 At present, Internet chat 
rooms and BBSs are used to debate China’s foreign policy and 
provide a forum for shaping Chinese people’s opinions about the 
United States. It is not uncommon for foreign media to quote 
opinions expressed in BBSs and chat rooms, and this partly 
explains why the opinions expressed there are relatively harsh 
toward the United States.  
   According to an opinion survey of vocational school, 
university and graduate school students conducted jointly by 
American and Chinese scholars in 2000, Internet users, in 
comparison with non-users, tend to have a stronger interest in 
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Sino-American relations, have a more favorable impression of 
the United States, and give higher marks to the fairness of 
reporting on China by American media.23  
These points indicate that today’s Internet users in 
China hold a relatively friendly image of the United States. 
In other words, the hawkish views on the United States expressed 
in BBSs or chat rooms do not necessarily stem from a certain 
perception of the United States among users. Rather, it may be 
said that BBSs and chat rooms are subject to relatively moderate 
control by the government, and thus provide a forum for 
expressing opinions that cannot easily be placed into 
newspapers, radios, television or magazines, over which the 
government wields stronger control.  
 
4. Images of the United States on BBSs 
 
One gets a strong impression that anti-American nationalism is 
alive and well on the Internet. SINA Corporation 
(http://sina.com) of China established a BBS on January 7, 2003. 
The author examined public opinions about the United States, 
by searching the 15 most frequently viewed posts on the BBS each 
day during the seven months from the board’s establishment to 
July 2003. The topics covered by the top 15 posts concerning 
the United States and the number of times they were viewed24 
are summarized in Table 5 below. 
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Table 5. Images of the United States Seen on “Sina.com.cn” 
January 
No. of topics 7 
No. of times the posts 
were viewed 
???? 
Topics * American hackers attack servers in China 
* Introduction to issues related to the United States: 
Election system and bureaucrats 
Development and trends in the U.S. media 
CNN broadcasting 
Websites of English-language magazines 
English-language news reports on the anniversary of the signing of 
the U.S.-Vietnam peace accord (English news articles posted 
without translation) 
Criticisms of CNN and BBC for their critical stance on Iraq’s 
Saddam Hussein   
 
February  
No. of topics 29 
No. of times the posts 
were viewed 
????? 
Topics * Space Shuttle Columbia disaster (10) 
* Iraq-related matters (6) 
* China’s foreign policy 
* Patriotism 
* Criticisms of U.S. hegemonism 
* Introduction to issues related to the U.S.: 
Stories on ex-Pres. Clinton and wife Hillary 
Evaluation of China’s nuclear technology 
Criticisms against Chinese working for the CIA 
Comparison of U.S. and Chinese magazine industries 
Standards of living and residential environment in the U.S. 
Sunday editions of American newspapers 
U.S. media’s stance on China-related news 
Relationship between war and media 
Chinese people succeeding in the U.S. 
Latest American video games 
 
March  
No. of topics ?? 
No. of times the posts 
were viewed 
????? 
Topics * Iraq war (49) 
* War coverage by CCTV (14) 
* The Taiwan problem 
* International situation 
* Erroneous news reports by SINA Corporation 
* Introduction to issues related to the U.S.: 
Chinese people succeeding in the U.S. 
U.S. media’s stance on China-related news 
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April  
No. of topics ?? 
No. of times the posts 
were viewed 
????? 
Topics * Iraq war (59) 
* War coverage by CCTV (12) 
* U.S.-China strategic relations (4) 
* The “China threat”  
* Operations of MacDonald's in China 
* Chinese farmers’ visit to the U.S. 
* SARS 
* Introduction to issues related to the U.S.: 
Introduction of news media in the U.S. 
Decline in VOA audience rate 
Articles related to the centennial of The New York Times 
U.S. media’s coverage of Chinese soccer players 
 
May  
No. of topics ?? 
No. of times the posts 
were viewed 
????? 
Topics * SARS (2) 
* Iraq-related matters (4) 
* U.S. strategy toward North Korea (excluding China’s strategy 
toward North Korea) 
* China’s diplomatic strategy 
* Problems concerning the preferential treatment of foreign 
nationals in China 
* U.S.-China economic relations (issues related to multinational 
corporations) 
* Introduction to matters related to the U.S.: 
Best magazines receiving the “Ellies” National Magazine Awards 
for 2003 (2) 
Discussions about American and Chinese cultures 
News on the U.S. entertainment industry 
Chinese people succeeding in the U.S. 
U.S. media’s stance on China-related news (2)  
June  
No. of topics ?? 
No. of times the posts 
were viewed 
????? 
Topics * Iraq-related matters (4) 
* War coverage by CCTV, the Global Times (3) 
* U.S.-China relations (international relations, comparison of 
military might) (2) 
* The Taiwan problem 
* China’s diplomatic strategy (2)  
* The “10 Admonitions to Chinese” t-shirt incident  
* Introduction of U.S. media news articles: 
Operations of MacDonald's, Kentucky Fried Chicken  
The New York Times (2)  
U.S. media’s stance on China-related news 
Discussions about the nature of Americans  
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July  
No. of topics ?? 
No. of times the posts 
were viewed 
????? 
Topics  * Iraq-related matters (3) 
* China’s diplomatic strategy (7)  
* The U.S. and North Korea (2) 
* The revaluation of the Chinese yuan (renminbi) 
* The “China threat”  
* Language skills of Chinese diplomats 
* Nixon’s visit to China 
* The Korean War (2)  
* American professor teaching at a Chinese University appearing 
on CCTV programs 
* Introduction of U.S. media news articles: 
Comparison between U.S. and Chinese mayors 
Monopoly by American media (2)  
Suppression of freedom of speech in the U.S. 
Income comparison between American and Chinese news reporters 
 Experiences of Chinese who visited the U.S. 
 
By country, only the United States and Japan constantly 
appeared among the 15 most frequently read posts during the 
January-July period, an indication that Chinese Internet users 
are tremendously interested in the United States and Japan. On 
the other hand, the number of U.S.-related topics included in 
the top 15 posts averaged about 32 a month for the seven months 
under review, far larger than the monthly average of seven for 
Japan-related topics. Clearly, Internet users in China are 
greatly interested in the United States. 
Regarding the sort of posts are likely to be read by many 
users and thus make the top 15 list, one Internet user with the 
name “True Dreams” (Zhenshi Mengjing) offers the following 
observation: people are drawn to posts that are likely to cause 
controversy, fuel the public’s anger or stimulate curiosity; 
address matters of social concern; or violate other people’s 
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privacy.25 The fact that BBS posts on matters related to the 
United States constantly draw a large number of views indicates 
that U.S.-related posts are at the center of social concern and 
are likely to be controversial, cause public’s anger or 
stimulate curiosity among Chinese Internet users. In other 
words, the Internet provides Chinese users with easy access to 
information on the United States, creating the possibility for 
mutual trust to develop between the two peoples. On the other 
hand, it is possible that BBSs and chat rooms generate public 
opinions about the United States without much objective 
information, and thus can fuel anti-American nationalism in a 
brief period of time. Immediately after the collision of the 
U.S. and Chinese military planes, the “Forum for a Stronger 
Nation” BBS saw a daily flood of over 5,000 posts regarding the 
incident, including fictitious stories on exchanges of fire 
between the Chinese air force jet and the American military 
plane as well as various groundless rumors,26 a clear reminder 
of problems involved in the use of BBSs. 
U.S.-related topics included among the 15 most frequently 
read posts as summarized in Table 5 can be grouped into the 
following five frequently discussed topics: 
 
1. Important news items, such as the Iraq war, the midair 
disintegration of the Space Shuttle Columbia, and SARS. 
2. China’s diplomatic strategy and Sino-American relations in 
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a broad sense, including the Taiwan problem, patriotism, the 
“China threat” and economic relations between China and the 
United States 
3. International news coverage by CCTV and other Chinese media  
4. U.S.-related topics and occurrences in China 
5. Introduction of various issues related to the United States  
 
(1) Important news followed in real-time 
On February 1, 2003, immediately after CCTV reported the 
midair disintegration of the U.S. Space Shuttle Columbia, the 
BBS was flooded with posts about the disaster. The posts went 
beyond discussing the accident itself, developing into 
“pro-U.S.” and “anti-U.S.” arguments. On February 4, the BBS 
managers announced they would no longer accept posts on the 
Columbia, forcibly putting an end to BBS discussions about the 
disaster. 
On March 19, 2003, U.S. and British forces initiated 
military operations against Iraq, launching cruise missiles 
into Baghdad and other Iraqi cities. Even before the start of 
the war, responses and attitudes of other countries toward the 
Iraq problem were widely “reported” in real-time BBS posts, with 
a clear line being drawn in discussions over the U.S. foreign 
policy. After the start of the war, the real-time posts 
effectively provided “live coverage” of the war situation, 
including developments with the American forces. Posts on the 
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Iraq war expressed a great variety of opinions, ranging from 
accounts of the misery caused by war and criticisms of the 
American “iron hand” to criticisms of the Saddam Hussein 
government. Iraq-related discussions wound down after 
large-scale fighting came to a close, but still persisted on 
a reduced scale. 
SARS is not really a U.S.-related news topic. However, 
BBS posts on SARS, which first broke out in China, criticized 
the American media’s coverage of the spread of the disease 
within China for openly questioning the credibility of patient 
numbers officially announced by the Chinese government and for 
intentionally overestimating the number of patients in China. 
 
(2) China’s diplomatic strategy and strategy toward the U.S. 
BBSs carried broad exchanges of views about China’s 
external strategy and policy toward the United States, 
including the Taiwan problem, patriotism, the idea of a “China 
threat” and economic relations between China and the United 
States. 
Internet chat rooms and BBSs are playing a major role in 
providing a forum for opinions that fall outside of the official 
line of the Chinese government. 
Since the Kosovo conflict, Chinese scholars in 
international relations have been divided into two camps on the 
issue of “whether the international situation surrounding China 
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has deteriorated”: “hard-liners” toward the United States and 
those who prefer “cooperation.” Though the debate among 
scholars became more subdued after the government’s 
pronouncement of its official policy in favor of cooperation 
with the United States, the hard-line stance toward the United 
States still comes to the fore via the print and broadcast media 
at almost every turn of the international situation and 
following any apparent shift in the U.S. policy toward China.27 
As far as BBS posts are concerned, however, hard-line opinions 
on the Taiwan problem and criticisms of the “dispirited” 
Taoguang Yanghui (“Bide our Time, Build our Capacities”) policy 
have not died down on the Internet. 
Hard-line opinions toward the United States stood out 
among BBS posts, often expressed in extreme statements. But it 
is also true that there were opinions in favor of a flexible 
attitude toward the United States. It deserves special mention 
that the public opinions on the United States expressed via BBS 
posts were never totally one-sided, with pro and con arguments 
always coexisting. 
 
(3) News coverage by CCTV and other major Chinese media 
Quite a number of posts offered analysis of the coverage 
of the Iraq war by major Chinese government-affiliated media, 
including CCTV and the Global Times. Some of these posts focused 
on the international competitiveness of the Chinese media and 
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the direction of their reform, while others attempted to delve 
into the Chinese government’s policy stance on the Iraq war by 
analyzing how government-affiliated media reported the 
U.S.-led campaign against Iraq. In a broader sense, some posts 
regarding the news coverage by CCTV and other major Chinese 
media were indeed discussing China’s foreign policy strategy. 
 
(4) U.S.-related topics and occurrences in China 
There were topics about the behavior of American 
nationals living in China. During the course of the seven months 
under review, there were posts that introduced an American 
lecturer who was teaching at a Chinese University and was 
sympathetic to China, who was a semi-permanent resident in China. 
On the other hand, some posts lashed out against an American 
who wore a t-shirt printed with “10 Admonitions for Chinese,” 
as “insulting toward the Chinese people.” 
Topics such as the latter example are inconsequential in 
nature, but can develop into a major issue depending on how 
national sentiment flares up. 
 
(5) Introduction of various issues related to the United States 
   Unlike the most frequent BBS posts on Japan,28, those on the 
U.S. that constantly ranked high on the list of frequently read 
posts often provided objective facts about the United States. 
These posts covered a wide variety of topics, including the 
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level of living of ordinary Americans, newspapers and magazines, 
the political system, U.S. views of China, Chinese living in 
the United States, and entertainment industry-related gossip.  
Posts on U.S. standards of living, newspapers and 
magazines, and the political system were mostly favorable, with 
the United States seen as a goal for China’s economic 
development.  
Posts about American media’s coverage of China were 
mostly critical of the United States for inventing an image of 
China as a “monster.” With regard to U.S. views of China’s 
national strength such as its nuclear technology, many posts 
introduced American opinions expressing appreciating China’s 
economic growth. 
 
As discussed above, the images of the United States seen 
in BBS posts differ widely depending on the topic and theme, 
making it difficult to categorically describe them as positive, 
negative or neutral. However, it can be safely said that 
Internet users in China regard the United States as a country 
that is very important to China, and are very sensitive toward 
developments in U.S.-China relations and China’s foreign policy 
strategy. They seem divided over U.S. foreign policy in general 
and particularly over U.S. policy toward China, with some 
holding friendly feelings toward the United States and others 
expressing animosity toward it. Among specific images of the 
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United States are an American mass media that invented the 
“monstrous China,” a “United States that acknowledges China’s 
economic growth and its attractiveness,” and a “model of 
economic growth and political advancement.” 
However, U.S.-related BBS posts hold the potential to 
unleash abrupt rises in anti-American nationalism in China even 
during periods of relative quietness in U.S.-China relations. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Some people believe that the transition from He Shang in the 
1980s to The China That Can Say No in the 1990s is a process 
of Chinese nationalism moving from seeking internal reform 
toward exclusive nationalism.29 As discussed earlier, however, 
images of the United States in China are quite complex and 
divided into two opposite vectors—sympathy and 
antipathy—toward the United States, and therefore 
anti-American sentiments should not be highlighted 
unilaterally. China’s nationalism, which became conspicuous in 
the 1990s, contains many elements that cannot be understood 
automatically from the perspective of exclusive nationalism. 
The images of the United States held by the Chinese public since 
the end of the Cold War have the following characteristics.  
 
1. Chinese people have ambivalent and complex images of the 
 40
United States, with two opposite vectors of sympathy and 
antipathy. As indicated by the popularity of the books with a 
strong tinge of anti-Americanism published in the 1990s, the 
Chinese public’s strong apprehensions about U.S. policy toward 
China, particularly in the area of security, have provided the 
backbone for China’s hard-line stance toward the United States. 
This anti-American nationalism represents the public 
perception of Chinese toward the outside world, based on the 
current conditions of Sino-American relations, and involve 
calling for a reshaping of the security scheme in the 
Asia-Pacific region in the wake of the end of the Cold War. 
 
2. The four stages of the popularity of novels on Chinese 
students studying overseas clearly reflect a process of the 
Chinese public losing confidence in their own country in the 
1980s and subsequently recovering that self-confidence, with 
the backing of the country’s high economic growth. Literary 
works in the 1990s describing the lives of Chinese students 
studying abroad as well as Chinese people overseas who were 
distressed by cultural differences between the U.S. and China, 
shattered the unrealistic images of the U.S. held by the Chinese 
public. On the other hand, the popularity of books on China’s 
economic development, foreigners coming to China for an 
opportunity to achieve success, Chinese coming home from 
overseas in pursuit of a “Chinese dream,” and literary works 
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on young Chinese students studying abroad with a high level of 
confidence in their home country and in themselves, mirror the 
recovery of confidence among ordinary Chinese people in their 
own country. In this sense, the anti-American nationalism may 
become relativized in the process of China’s deepening 
self-awareness. 
 
3. Though there is a widespread impression that anti-American 
nationalism is particularly evident in BBS posts or opinions 
voiced in chat rooms, pro- and anti-American opinions continue 
to coexist on the Internet, as discussed earlier. There are 
multiple criteria for judgments about the United States. On one 
hand, the Chinese public holds the American media responsible 
for having invented the image of China as a “monster.” However, 
Chinese people highly regard the lifestyle of Americans, the 
U.S. economy and the political system. The image of the United 
States as a “model of economic growth and political 
advancement,” which was basically formed during the 1980s, 
remains intact even now. Meanwhile, some Chinese people see the 
United States as “startled by China’s economic growth.” 
All in all, the images of the United States held by the 
Chinese public are complex. Chinese people have a sense of 
affinity toward the United States, yet some advocate 
anti-Americanism. However, anti-American nationalism in China, 
driven mostly by the present conditions in U.S.-China relations, 
 42
is most fundamentally characterized by “suspicions,” rather 
than repulsion or hostility. 
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